It's Bad In Basra, Worse In Baghdad

Sydney Morning Herald

Monday September 26, 2005

Britain did not win, and lose, the most far-flung empire in history without learning a bit about dealing with insurgencies and civil unrest. Its armed forces have had much practice, with recent refresher courses in Northern Ireland. So it is unsurprising that in Iraq - where the Americans initially proved themselves, by dint of firepower and technology, world champions at making war - the British are seen as more subtle and effective in dealing with war's messy aftermath. True, British forces have the easier assignment, in Iraq's Shiite south, while their US counterparts grapple with the mayhem in Baghdad, the so-called Sunni triangle and the western badlands. Yet this only makes the latest outbreak of anti-British violence in Basra, the major city in the south, the more alarming. If the security there is deteriorating, what price enduring progress further north?

The Howard Government and all Australians have a lot at stake here. The province of Al-Muthanna, where our troops are protecting Japanese engineers and training Iraqis, is one of four in the zone of British responsibility. In July, the then British commander suggested that Al-Muthanna and another province could be handed over to Iraqi forces later this year. Now it seems that an early, substantial withdrawal of British (or Australian) troops is less likely. If so, the timing of the Basra flare-up is bad for Canberra and London, which both face continuing strain on their already stretched military resources. Australia has just made a new deployment of special forces to Afghanistan, and has indicated it may send more troops there, while Britain is preparing to lead NATO's Afghanistan peacekeeping force.

Both governments must hope the explosion of rage on Basra's streets was the isolated outcome of peculiar circumstances - the capture of two undercover British SAS soldiers, their alleged handover by Iraqi authorities to Shiite militiamen, and the soldiers' subsequent rescue by British forces after an armoured vehicle had demolished a wall protecting a police station. After all, Basra has returned to relative normality after past outbreaks, notably bombings in April last year in which nearly 70 people died.

But despite reassurances by British and Iraqi ministers, the fear is that last Monday's ugly scenes - British soldiers fleeing a firebombed tank - could signal a new, nasty phase. Basra's council has stopped co-operating with British forces. It is widely reported, and partially confirmed officially, that Iraqi security forces in Basra have been infiltrated by extremists, some funded by Iran or linked to the firebrand cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, a leading player in last year's Shia insurgency.

All this, combined with the continuing violence in and around Baghdad, is playing badly with British and US public opinion. Yet a respectable exit strategy remains elusive. No significant reduction of coalition troop commitments seems feasible until after October's constitutional referendum and the elections to follow. Even if those hurdles can be cleared, and the numbers and capability of Iraq's rag-tag security forces improved, an eventual withdrawal will need to be phased and gradual. And the new Iraq left behind will not be the one George Bush envisaged.

© 2005 Sydney Morning Herald

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